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Abstract In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the
sociology of markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The
initial premise is that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction,
which can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I
define these coordination problems as the value problem, the problem of competition
and the cooperation problem. I argue that these problems can only be resolved based
on stable reciprocal expectations on the part of market actors, which have their basis
in the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embedding of markets. The
sociology of markets aims to investigate how market action is structured by these
macrostructures and to examine their dynamic processes of change. While the focus
of economic sociology has been primarily on the stability of markets and the
reproduction of firms, the conceptualization developed here brings change and profit
motives more forcefully into the analysis. It also differs from the focus of the new
economic sociology on the supply side of markets, by emphasizing the role of
demand for the order of markets, especially in the discussion of the problems of
valuation and cooperation.
Markets are the central institutions of capitalist economies. The development of
modern capitalism can be viewed as a process of the expansion of markets as
mechanisms for the production and allocation of goods and services. This applies not
just to labor markets, which only emerged on a significant scale with industriali-
zation, but also to the organization of the production and distribution of consumer
and investment goods, services, and commodities. The increasing separation of the
economy from the household and its organization through market exchange allowed
for a scope in the development in the division of labor and production of wealth that
would otherwise have been unattainable.
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No one seriously questions the central role of markets in capitalism. This makes it
all the more surprising how restricted the attention has been to the study of markets in
modern economic theory, but also in the other social sciences that address economic
subject matter. For a long time, modern economics focused only in a very limited way
on markets. General equilibrium theory, as the heart of neoclassical economic theory,
analyzed the formation of efficient distribution equilibria via the market. The interest
here was not in studying the empirical functioning of markets and its institutional
preconditions (Coase 1988: 7–8; Lie 1992: 508), but rather in the mathematical proof
of efficiency postulates, conducted under a variety of simplifying assumptions. These
include not just the assumption of the flexibility of prices, but also, in particular,
assumptions concerning the characteristics of goods as well as the actors’ rationality
and information supply. Neoclassical economic theory thus has not so much a theory
of the market as a “pure theory of exchange” (White 1990: 3).
In its founding phase, sociology was interested in the institutional preconditions
for markets, as reflected especially in the work of Max Weber (Weber 1978) and
Émile Durkheim (Durkheim 1947). By the post-war period, however, sociologists
interested in economic structures were far more concerned with analyzing the
organization of industrial production processes. Only labor markets received more
intensive attention. The reason for this may be sought in the strong state influence in
the organization of post-war economies, which curtailed the impact of the market
mechanism (Djelic 2006: 59), but also in the influence of Talcott Parsons and his
suggestion for the division of labor between economics and sociology (Beckert
2002: 135ff). Later, the orientation towards Marxist approaches with their primary
interest in exploitation in the sphere of production contributed to a de-emphasis on
markets in sociological scholarship as well.
It was only developments in economics and sociology since the 1970s and
the 1980s, respectively, that put markets back in the spotlight as a field of
empirical study (Krippner 2001; Lie 1997; Swedberg 2003: 115). In this article, I
sketch the constitutive concern situated at the core of the sociology of markets
and outline the research problems that must be addressed in order to understand
the operation of markets. I argue that the core issue of the sociology of markets is
to explain the order of markets. How is it possible that economic activities can be
coordinated through markets despite the heterogeneous and partly antagonistic
motives and interests of the participants? By coordination I mean that actors
succeed in aligning their actions in ways that allow for market exchange to take
place because they can form expectations about what others will do and because
the expected behavior of others is sufficiently compatible with their own material
or ideal interests. This notion of coordination corresponds to the concept of
“mutual coordination,” i.e., “to act together in a smooth concerted way” (Klein
1997: 326). It also matches the use of the term in convention theory, where
coordination is understood as “agreement” among actors “about what is to be
done” (Storper and Salais 1997: 16). Such coordination is a precondition to what
I call the order of markets.
My point of departure is that markets are highly presuppositional arenas of social
interaction in which actors are confronted with profound coordination problems.
“[A]n actor subject to uncertainty must make an effort to determine how to
coordinate successfully with other actors to deal with the situation at hand. This
246 Theor Soc (2009) 38:245–269
makes the central problem one of producing coordination among actors” (Storper
and Salais 1997: 14). While redistribution and reciprocity also entails coordination
problems, these problems become much more taxing in markets. This is not only
because market behavior cannot be aligned through a chain of command or through
tradition but also because capitalist economies constantly create new markets and
destroy old ones, which leads to a continuous reentering of uncertainty both inside
the economy and outside of it. Due to the emergence of new markets, the entering of
new market actors in existing markets and changing strategies of market actors, the
order of markets is in a dynamic flux, where actors oscillate between the search for
stability and the destruction of this stability.
I argue that three coordination problems in the sense of “mutual coordination” can
be analytically distinguished: I call them the value problem, the problem of
competition, and the cooperation problem. These coordination problems can only be
resolved if market actors are able to form stable expectations with regard to the
actions of other market actors and future events relevant for their decisions, and if
they consider the expected outcomes to be sufficiently in their material interest and
normatively acceptable. In this sense markets are understood as “fully social
institutions, reflecting a complex alchemy of politics, culture, and ideology”
(Krippner 2001: 782). While the notion of the “order of markets” refers to the
macrolevel result of the solution of the three identified coordination problems,
the expectations formed by actors constitute the building blocks of this order on the
actor level.
In line with other sociological approaches to markets, I pursue the argument that
market actors’ expectations are formed by the structural, institutional and cultural
embeddedness of market exchange (Dobbin 2004a; Fligstein 2001a; Granovetter
1985; White 1981). This reveals market exchange to be a form of social interaction that
cannot be explained by a “natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange” (Smith
1976: 17), but only by the institutional structures, social networks, and horizons of
meaning within which market actors meet. While the conceptualization is informed by
the new economic sociology and especially by the work of Neil Fligstein (Fligstein
1996, 2001a, b), it differs from it at the same time on several accounts: Instead of
focusing primarily on the stability of markets and the reproduction of firms, it
brings change and profit motives more forcefully into the analysis. It also differs
from the focus of the new economic sociology on the supply side of markets, by
emphasizing the role of demand for the order of markets, especially in the
discussion of the problems of valuation and cooperation. Finally, market struggles
are not understood as being confined to struggles between producers but as also
entailing a conflict between the economy and wider social spheres. I contribute to
the sociological conceptualization of markets the distinction between the three
coordination problems, each of which has been extensively discussed individually,
but which have not been recognized as forming a comprehensive tableau of
founding problems for the sociology of markets. If the order of markets depends on
the resolution of the three identified coordination problems and if this resolution
depends on the formation of stable expectations on the side of market actors, the
task of market sociology is to study both the emergence and change of the social
macrostructures relevant in the market context and the structuring of market action—
and the distribution of exchange opportunities—by these macrostructures.
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In the first part of the article, I provide a brief outline of the analysis of markets in
several economic approaches and in economic sociology with reference to the
vantage point just sketched. In the second part, I introduce and discuss the three
coordination problems based on a theoretical explanation of why these problems
comprise the central subject matter for the sociological analysis of markets. In the
third part, I counter the impression that a sociological approach to markets centered
on the order of markets would lead to a static perspective by developing a model of
the dynamic changes of markets, arguing that the dynamics of markets emerges from
a constant oscillation between the stabilization and destabilization of expectations.
This is followed by a brief conclusion.
The social order of markets
Markets are arenas of social interaction. They provide a social structure and
institutional order for the voluntary exchange of rights in goods and services, which
allow actors to evaluate, purchase, and sell these rights (Aspers and Beckert 2008).
Markets contain not only the element of exchange but are characterized by
competition, which means that the existence of a market presupposes at least three
actors: one on one side of the market confronting at least two other actors on the
other side whose offers can be compared. “A market may be said to exist wherever
there is competition, even if only unilateral, for opportunities of exchange among a
plurality of potential parties” (Weber 1985, Vol 1: 635). Actors on both sides of the
market interface have partly similar and partly conflicting interests: while they must
both be interested in the exchange of a good, they have conflicting interests
regarding the price and other specifications of the contract from which a “price
struggle” between them emerges that results—if the exchange is to take place—in a
compromise between the exchange partners.
How is it that economic production and distribution can be successfully organized
through markets? At first sight, this may seem to be a pointless question, since
billions of market transactions take place “silently” every day, and the coordination
of the production and distribution of commodities via the market thus appears to be
quite unproblematic. Only by adopting an outside perspective do we realize how
presuppositional and thus improbable the coordination of economic processes via
markets actually is. For all market actors the organization of economic activities
through markets entails risks that seem to make it unlikely that they would entrust
their economic well-being to this mechanism: The producer may not find a buyer for
his product at a profitable price, either because potential purchasers do not need it or
because a competitor captures his business. Buyers and sellers may not fulfill their
contractual responsibilities, defrauding their exchange partners instead. The product
may not possess the promised qualities. Buyers do not know whether they might not
be able to purchase the product more cheaply or in a better quality elsewhere, or
whether the purchase of another product will turn out to be more profitable. Workers
do not know whether their labor power will meet a demand in the labor market.
These examples show that market exchange is full of contingencies beyond the
control of single actors and, thus, of a high degree of uncertainty in regard to
outcomes. The contingencies of market exchange make markets precarious arenas of
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social interaction, the “functioning” of which is anything but self-evident. Only
when it is possible to integrate the individual behavior of market actors in such a
way that they develop enough confidence to accept the risks of market exchange can
the market operate as a mechanism for the fulfillment of adaptive functions in
society. But how can we explain this integration of action and thus the order of
markets?
Economics
The most influential answer to this question is provided by liberal economic theory
and is based on the assumption that actors participate in market exchange out of
self-interest. According to this view, “social order” can be stabilized in markets
because exchange offers advantages to the individual participants. The liberal train
of thought is not limited to explaining individual participation in markets, but
entails a theory of social order as well. The coordination of economic activities
through markets leads to an efficient allocation of economic resources where
exchange takes place until no actor can increase his or her utility further without
making at least one actor worse off (Pareto optimality). This explanation of the
stability and efficiency of markets, however, depends on far-reaching assumptions
regarding the way actors make decisions and the information they have with which
to make them. As long as one takes for granted that these assumptions are being
met, one can explain the order of markets in terms of the self-interest of
participating actors and restrict the study of markets to the creation of equilibria
through price adjustment. “[O]rder is grounded in each agent acting rationally to
maximize his or her own preferences within the constraints of a competitive
economy” (Gould 1991: 92–93; cf. also Hirschman 1986: 123). To invert the
argument, this means that the problem of order returns as soon as we depart from
the idealized assumptions of neoclassical theory with its “single exit” solutions
(Latsis 1972).
Large parts of the development of economic theory since the 1970s have been
attempts to understand what would happen to the equilibrium model if one changed
its assumptions: if one abandoned the premise of complete information and
radicalized the economic model of action in a Hobbesian manner.
The two most important lines of research here are information economics
(Akerlof 1970; Stigler 1961) and the new institutional economics (North 1990;
Richter and Furubotn 2003; Williamson 1975, 1985, 2000). Information economics
abandons the assumption that actors are completely informed about the quality of a
commodity. The paradigmatic point of departure for this line of research is George
Akerlof’s essay “A Market for Lemons” (Akerlof 1970), in which he shows that
assuming an asymmetrical distribution of information—the potential buyer of a used
car knows less about the characteristics of the automobile for sale than the seller—no
market for used cars develops, that is, market failure ensues. The solution proposed
by the economics of information involves the introduction of safeguarding
institutions by vendors, such as guarantees on used automobiles or investment in
the vendor’s reputation, which reduce the purchasers’ risks (of buying a “lemon”)
and increase their willingness to purchase. The market is less efficient in this case
than it would be if all parties were fully informed, but market failure can be avoided.
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The new institutional economics radicalizes the action assumptions of neoclas-
sical theory by giving up the notion (asserted since the beginnings of modern
economics) of an “honest merchant” who acts based on his or her self-interest, while
at the same time respecting the property rights of others (Hirschman 1987). This
assumption is supplanted by a Hobbesian model of action centered around the
notions of “opportunism” and “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 1975:
255). In this model of action, it is assumed that an agent will opportunistically seek
his own advantage, and, if this is in his or her interest, do so also by ruthlessly
violating the interests of his or her exchange partner in the process. Opportunism and
“bounded rationality” (Simon 1955) comprise a situation of uncertainty, which
causes market failure. Market institutions, which are explained based on their
contribution to efficiency, permit the stabilization of market actors’ expectations by
guarding against opportunism, thus helping to make markets possible.
The new economic sociology
The new economic sociology, whose development over the past twenty years has
made the study of markets an important subject of sociological research once again,
also takes up the problem of explaining the order of markets (Aspers 2005; Fligstein
2001a; Podolny 2005; Swedberg 2003; White 2001). In doing so, however, it does
not share the individualist basis of economic theories.1 From the sociological
perspective the departure from the assumptions made by standard neoclassical
economics have far more serious consequences for the understanding of markets than
economic approaches assume, because they fundamentally challenge explanations of
ordering processes that proceed from an individualistic vantage point and contest an
understanding of institutions as efficient responses to uncertainty.
Two phenomena account for this: First, social macrostructures are devised in a
field structured by already existing institutional regulations, making institutional
continuities and changes dependent on past occurrences, and the equipment of actors
with power deriving from their positions within the market field (Streeck and Thelen
2005; Djelic and Quack 2007: 163ff). The existing market structures are a social
force patterning future developments which must not follow a path toward increased
efficiency.
Second, the uncertainty actors confront keeps them from being able to predict
which strategies and institutional structures will lead to an optimal outcome. It is
impossible for actors to anticipate what would be the optimal institutional design
(Beckert 1996, 2002; Jagd 2007: 77ff). The imponderables that result from strategic
uncertainty and the essential unpredictability of future events belie an understanding
1 Émile Durkheim’s (Durkheim 1984) concept of the non-contractual elements of contract makes it clear
that the observance of contracts by market parties presupposed in neoclassical theory could not be
explained solely in terms of the interests of the participating actors. Max Weber’s (Weber 1978, 1992)
explanation of the development of the institutional foundations and individual action dispositions against
the backdrop of which modern western capitalism arose is also not based, in terms of contract theory, on
the self-interest of the participants, but rather on power-saturated political processes and religious
transformations. Institutions are thus not to be understood as efficient responses to information problems.
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of market action that proceeds from atomized, utility-maximizing actors.2 Actors do
not have the calculative bases for optimizing their utility functions in the face of
bounded rationality, social interdependence and new action situations (Beckert 2002:
7ff). In consequence, uncertainty leads actors to resort to socially anchored scripts or
“conventions” that serve as a “collectively recognized reference” (Orléan, quoted in
Jagd 2007: 79), providing orientation for intentionally rational actors in situations
where optimal responses cannot be foreseen.3 These “substitutes” for optimizing in
the sense of economic theory reduce uncertainty based on culturally anchored
understandings of situations, allowing actors to make sense of the complex
circumstances of the decisions they face and to coordinate their interactions. Hence
individual decision making must be understood within its social contexts that lead to
the “framing of markets” (Fiss and Kennedy 2007). Sociological explanations of the
emergence, stability, and change of institutions and their effects on market
interaction thus differ fundamentally from the economic approach: Institutions are
understood not from a contractarian perspective as the efficient result of an
agreement of socially unbound individuals, but rather as situated within a specific
political, social and cultural context that constitutes the actors’ goals, strategies, and
cognitive orientations.
It is, however, not only that uncertainty provides the background to the
embeddedness of economic action; uncertainty is also a critical element of the
dynamics of markets (Beckert 2002; Deutschmann 1999). It is only in situations
where outcomes cannot be fully rationally calculated and are therefore not
determined by “single exits,” that “new combinations” (Schumpeter) are possible
which provide profit opportunities that can be seized by entrepreneurs who “breach
previously separated spheres” (Granovetter 2002: 44). Uncertainty opens up
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity and is therefore a necessary condition for
the dynamic change of capitalist economies. Due to this link with practices of
dynamic change, uncertainty ties the question of the order of markets to the dynamic
development of this order.
In the past twenty years, the concept of embeddedness has become established in
economic sociology as a categorical instrument for describing the ordering processes
that lead to a reduction of the uncertainty and the social structuring of decisions in
markets (Granovetter 1985).4 The differentiation of the concept of embeddedness—
Zukin und DiMaggio (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990) distinguish between social,
cultural, political, and cognitive embeddedness—points to different approaches in
market sociology. What these approaches share is the assumption of action-
structuring social macrostructures. However, each stresses a different social
2 In game theory, the idea of the “institution as the equilibrium outcome of a game” was introduced to
resolve this problem (Schotter 1981: 155). Institutions are understood here not as “rules of the game” as
they are in the new institutional economics, but rather as a Nash equilibrium in a repeated non-cooperative
game. This solution, however, demands perfect rationality and thus has preconditions that neither the new
institutional economics nor economic sociology anticipates. On this, see Richter 2000).
3 Furthermore, in non-cooperative games like the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperative strategies lead to more
efficient outcomes, also rejecting rational actor theory as a normative theory of utility maximization.
4 The use of the term in the new economic sociology, however, has little in common with its meaning in
the work of Karl Polanyi, to whom the concept is generally attributed (Beckert 2007; Krippner 2001).
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macrostructure shaping market outcomes (Dobbin 2004a; Fligstein and Dauter 2007;
Fourcade 2007). The network approach associated particularly with the works of
Mark Granovetter (Granovetter 1985, 2002) and Harrison White (White 1981,
2001), emphasizes the social embeddedness of market actors. By contrast, the
institutional approach, which is associated with the work, for instance, of Neil
Fligstein (Fligstein 2001a), Frank Dobbin (Dobbin 1994) and Bruce Carruthers
(Carruthers 1994; Carruthers and Halliday 1998), primarily stresses the institutional
embeddedness of market exchange.5 Finally, the third approach in the sociology of
markets, which shows significant overlaps with the institutional approach, is
centered on notions of cultural and cognitive embeddedness, emphasizing the
meaning structures relevant in the behavior of market actors (DiMaggio 1994;
MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Meyer and Rowen 1977; Zelizer 1979, 1994, 2007).6
Value, competition and cooperation as central coordination problems
The explanation of economic outcomes in terms of social contexts is the common
denominator in the differing approaches to market sociology (see Dobbin 2004b).
While innumerable empirical studies based on the three above-mentioned
approaches demonstrate the role played by social macrostructures in the explanation
of economic outcomes, when it comes to addressing theoretically the systematic
problems to which the embeddedness of economic action is actually a response, they
remain largely silent.7 How is it possible to integrate interaction in a social arena
5 While the concept of cultural embeddedness has not produced an independent school of thought within
the sociology of markets, it has asserted itself strongly in various combinations with the network approach
and the institutional approach (Bourdieu 1999; Bourdieu 2005; DiMaggio 1994; Zelizer 1979). Political
embeddedness, along with discussions of the state regulation of markets, is associated with the institutional
approach. By emphasizing the importance of formal institutions and state regulation in constituting and
stabilizing markets, some authors associated with the institutional approach exhibit an affinity to
comparative political economy, and its attribution of different national strategies of firms to the specific
institutional structures of national economies (Hall and Soskice 2001: 4ff). Comparative political
economy, however, focuses on the explanation of entrepreneurial strategies rather than the analysis of
market relations. As a result, comparative political economy is far more interested in the production
problems of firms. The observed coordination problems focus on the question of how and under what
conditions firms gain access to the resources they need to manufacture products (Hall and Soskice 2001:
4). Market sociology, in contrast, stresses the coordination problems that arise in the exchange of goods or
services, drawing more attention to the exchange processes themselves and to the demand side.
6 The more recently developed performativity approach (Callon 1998; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu
2007) is further away from institutionalism. It stresses the role of economic theories in explaining the
structuration of markets (Garvia 2007) and actor strategies in markets (MacKenzie and Millo 2003). This
enables it to demonstrate that the way economic actors think about the functioning of markets actually
shapes markets by aligning organizational structures, strategies, and reciprocal expectations of market
participants.
7 The new economic sociology has focused so strongly on demonstrating the embeddedness of market
action by means of empirical investigation that an important question has been virtually disregarded:
Which theroretical issues can be addressed by focusing on the embeddedness of market behavior?
Frequently, programmatic statements aimed at defining a future research agenda for economic sociology
either stress approaches (Dobbin 2004b) or identify appealing empirical research topics (Carruthers 2005:
346ff; Zelizer 2007).
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populated by actors with highly diverse backgrounds and conflicting interests? I
contend that the coordination problems faced by market actors in the complex and
uncertain situations in which they make decisions are at the heart of a sociological
approach to markets. The notion of the “order of markets” expresses in abstract
terms the explanandum of the sociology of markets.
I argue that one can distinguish between three fundamental coordination problems
which represent at the same time the central sources of uncertainty for market actors.
Their resolution is a precondition for the order of markets and fixes distributional
outcomes from market exchange which lead to social stratification. I call these issues
the value problem, the problem of competition, and the cooperation problem. These
three themes provide a comprehensive tableau of the relevant coordination issues in
markets. The sociology of markets must be able to demonstrate its contribution to
the understanding of these coordination problems relative to economic approaches
that often address the very same questions, and which in their most advanced
expressions have undergone a “sociological turn” (Greif 2006: XV).
I discuss the three topics in turn, addressing for each of them the questions of how
social macrostructures contribute to the resolution of the problems at hand and how
the emergence and change of these macrostructures can be explained. This framing
of the sociology of markets rejects the distinction between network approaches,
institutional approaches, and cognitive advances since networks, institutions, and
cognition are seen as complementary in the resolution of the cited problems.8
The value problem
The value problem refers to the constitution of actor preferences and thereby stresses
the demand side of markets, which is ignored by many approaches in the sociology
of markets (Fligstein 2001a; White 1981). One crucial source of uncertainty
confronting market actors derives from the difficulties of assessing the value of
commodities. Given the multiplicity of goods and their complex quality properties,
demanders have trouble “forming clear subjective values for goods in the market”
(Koçak 2003: 8). Only when potential purchasers are in a position to distinguish
between the values of goods, and sellers can reliably demonstrate the value of their
goods, will uncertainty be reduced and a disposition to buy arise (Koçak 2003: 5–6).
This is a central initial problem of market sociology, referring to the constitution
of demand, which finds no place in neoclassical economic theory. The latter assumes
preferences to be given and stable, and thereby exogenizes their emergence and
change.9 This led to Talcott Parsons’ critique (Parsons 1949) that economic theory
was caught up in a “utilitarian dilemma.” What he meant was that economic theory
either explained action goals on the basis of behaviorist determinism or had to leave
8 While there is a general unease with regard to the separation of these three approaches in economic
sociology (Fourcade 2007: 1026), few articles address this problem explicitly. One excellent exception to
this is (Djelic 2004), who shows the connections between networks and processes of institutionalization.
9 The notion of revealed preferences used by economists (Samuelson 1938) does not provide a theory of
preference formation but looks at preferences post hoc.
Theor Soc (2009) 38:245–269 253
them unexplained, viewing them as random tastes: De gustibus non est disputandum
(Stigler and Becker 1977). This did not mean that neoclassical theory was wrong,
but that it contained a central limitation, since it could not explain the arisal of
preferences or the assignment of value to goods. Parsons’ solution consisted in the
introduction of ultimate values on the basis of which actors determine their action
goals, which points to the social—and not individualist—constitution of preferences.
How, though, are we to understand the processes of classification and commensuration
with which actors assign value to goods?
(1) The value problem is concerned, on the one hand, with the assignment of
different values to heterogeneous products within the same market. The classifica-
tion may be based on standards that make it possible to offer objective quality
descriptions of products in relation to other products of the same class. Thus, the
determination of the load-bearing capacity of steel springs from different alloys on
the basis of technical testing would be an example of a technically defined
classification for the purposes of quality distinction, which can form the basis of
value differentiations. Different steel springs of a specified quality offered by
different producers in the market can then be compared based on price, and
preferences can be formed. The basis for the classification is a technical standard.
Yet, even such classifications aimed solely at establishing the functional value of a
product in relation to others can be unambiguous only in the case of very simple
products. Once products turn out to be more complex, the valuation criteria
themselves become contested and must be established in political and social
processes. The question of what criteria to apply in assessing the value of used cars
also depends on conventions established in a technical field. The same holds true, for
instance, in decisions concerning the selection of personnel. Although employers aim
to hire the best or most suitable employees, the question of what criteria should be
used to establish an employee’s qualification is subject to dispute among experts,
changes over time and differs between countries (Segalla et al. 2001; Eymard-
Duvernay and Marchal 1997). The analysis by MacKenzie and Millo (MacKenzie and
Millo 2003) of the creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange shows how the
valuation of stock options became possible with advances in finance theory and the
development of technologies making the theory easily applicable for traders. Value
assessment is based on a financial theory that coordinates action of market participants
by providing a cognitive basis from which to judge the relative value of heterogeneous
products within the market.
The social processes behind the constitution of value become fully visible if we
turn to a market where objective standards of quality assessment play no role at all.
The market for contemporary art is such a market where actors have no recourse to
standards reflected in the product itself. In this market, assessments of value are
established in interactive processes of recognition within the field of art itself. It is
the recognition an artist finds among reputable and influential members of the art
world, such as art critics, museum curators, galleries and collectors, that establishes
the quality of his or her work (Becker 1982; Beckert and Rössel 2004; Velthuis
2003). Much the same is true of the wine market (Diaz-Bone 2005; Rössel 2007).
Although it is ultimately the individual buyer who decides what price he or she is
willing to pay for a product, the assessment of value is not entirely of his or her own
making, but rather relies on socially constructed judgements that reduce uncertainty
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and thereby stabilize expectations in a market field. “Confusion over the product’s
identity” (Zuckerman 1999: 1398) itself affects the value of goods. If the
classification of firms in terms which industrial sector they belong to is unclear, it
becomes more difficult for analysts and investors to assign meaning to the
information they gather from a firm, which in turn increases uncertainty and leads
to lower stock market prices (Zuckerman 1999). At the same time, the stability of
identities is constantly being undermined (Callon et al. 2002) because some actors
are interested in changing existing judgements through the introduction of new
products or reevaluating existing ones. Existing orders of valuation do not only
provide order in the market but also have specific distributive outcomes which are
contested. The emerging “market struggle” (Weber) aims at the change or
maintenance of value orders and is one essential way in which uncertainty is
constantly reintroduced in market fields, and thereby a crucial background to the
dynamism of capitalist markets.
(2) On the other hand, the value problem refers to the assignment of value to
goods of a certain class, for example automobiles, works of modern art or wine.
The value may result from the commodity’s functional contribution to solving a
specific problem, such as getting from point A to point B, or satisfying one’s
hunger. Contrary to the assumptions of economic theory, however, there is no
evidence that efficient solutions consistently win out, nor can we explain purchase
decisions in functionally saturated consumer markets biologically or in terms of
objective functional requirements. Thus the question of why actors value certain
products and not others is open to sociological analysis. The primary sociological
postulate is that the valuation of certain categories of goods is socially and
culturally patterned. This can be a normative orientation, a cognitive point of
reference or a possibility for social positioning that is “realized” by acquiring a
particular good.
The influence of normative assessments can be seen, for instance, in the effects of
religious dietary restrictions on the evaluation of certain foods (for example, pork
among Muslims and Jews). But it can also be seen in financial markets. Viviana
Zelizer’s (Zelizer 1979) work on the emergence of the life insurance industry in
nineteenth-century America demonstrates the initial blockage of market demand for
life insurance by religious (and superstitious) convictions. An illustration of the
relevance of normative and cognitive assessments for the valuation of products is
also provided by the economically small but theoretically interesting market for
whale watching. It did not come into existence until there were profound changes in
the symbolic meaning of whales in western culture (Lawrence and Phillips 2004).
While for centuries whales were regarded as dangerous and thus menacing giants—
e.g., in the epochal description by Herman Melville—today they symbolize the value
of freedom and of intact nature, and are deemed particularly worthy of protection.
Only on the basis of this shift of meaning did the value of life insurance and “whale
watching” as products and thus the emergence of a market become possible.
Assessments of specific characteristics of goods can form as “rationalized myths”
(Meyer and Rowen 1977) within institutional fields. In more general terms, the
normative and cognitive framing of markets, anchored in social belief systems, is a
constitutive element of their emergence because it shapes the assessment of the
desirability and suitability of the products offered and thus reduces uncertainty in
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markets. In this sense, “markets are explicitly moral projects, saturated with
normativity” (Fourcade and Healy 2007: 22).
(3) The uncertainty of value attribution is additionally reduced when products
facilitate status assignments. In this case the value of goods arises from the social
recognition stemming from their possession, which provides “status” to the owner.
Luxury products like yachts or antiques provide status because they are associated
with high costs that can be covered only by a small group of affluent people or
signal cultural capital and thereby enable their owner to demonstrate their social
distinction. The capability of goods to signal social status, however, is also an
instrument for differentiating the value of heterogeneous products within a market.
This can be shown based on the distinction between standard markets and status
markets (Aspers 2005). While the value order of products in standard markets is
based on the qualities of the product itself, the value order in status markets is based
on the social status of the producers and the consumers of the product. A good
example for this is the fashion market. The value of the very same handbag changes
radically depending on whether it is sold by “Gucci” or by “H&M” and whether it is
seen being carried by a celebrity. Hence the existence of a recognized status order
among producers leads to value differentiations because the status of the producer is
“contagious”; it is symbolically transferred to the consumer.
The more the value of products becomes detached from the fulfillment of purely
functional needs, the more they depend upon symbolic assignments of value that
must be constructed by market actors. When consumers are “attached” (Callon et al.
2002) to goods, expectations are stabilized and uncertainty with regard to the value
of a product reduced. To understand such attachments, market sociology needs a
theory of preference formation, which could be based in socialization theory,
learning theory, network analysis, or social movement theory. Talcott Parsons’s
(Parsons 1949) theory of action establishes the role of the internalization of norms as
an important aspect of preference formation. This remains, however, much too
general and also too static for understanding the dynamic changes of preferences in
markets. Pierre Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 2005) notion of habitus provides an
explanation for the valuation of goods based on the cultural capital of consumers
(drawing on socialization theory, Bourdieu speaks of habitus as “socialized
subjectivity”; Bourdieu 2005: 84). This is of great sociological interest because it
connects consumption to social stratification and sees stratification based on
differences not only in economic capital but in the accumulation of cultural capital
as well. Preferences can be also linked to network ties as can be seen for consumer
goods (DiMaggio and Louch 1998; Garvía 2007) and for investment goods
(Zuckerman 1999). Social movement theories enable us to explain the cycles in
demand, starting with a run on certain products and ending with their sudden demise
(Deutschmann 1999: 130; Fligstein 2001b).
A theory explaining preferences for specific goods needs to take the role of
producers and consumers into account. Producers attempt to create consumer
attachment to their goods through their marketing investments. These activities
account for an increasingly large proportion of production costs (Aspers 2005;
Callon et al. 2002) and are part of the market struggle between producers. Value
attachments, however, are also created in the lifeworlds of consumers, and
producers must react to new and often unpredictable trends that emerge. This
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implies that market sociology must put much more emphasis on the demand side of
markets.
It is through processes of standardization, cognitive anchoring, normative
legitimation, and social positioning that the subjective value attributions arise with
which market actors assign value to goods. It is not a question here of all actors
assigning the same value to a good, but rather of individual actors being sufficiently
convinced by their own valuations to want to acquire the corresponding
commodities as buyers in the marketplace. For this they not only rely on
institutionalized standards (Fligstein 2001a), network positions of producers
(Podolny 2005) or social norms (Zelizer 1979), but they must also take into account
a social dimension of their purchases that consists in their communication of social
belonging through buying products loaded with intersubjectively recognized
meaning. The assignments of value are subject to a dynamic process of change,
which is energized by technological or cultural innovations, advanced or impeded by
the marketing activities of producers aiming at increased profits, and supported by
consumer behavior aimed at the satisfaction of needs, hopes and social distinction
(Campbell 1987). In this sense uncertainty is never eliminated from the market but
remains a crucial resource that threatens existing sources of profit and providing new
profit opportunities for entrepreneurs. The indeterminacy of the situation makes it
“problematic” in the sense that it cannot be fully controlled through rational
calculation. At the same time it elicits innovative inquiry and will eventually lead to
new perspectives on what is valuable (Stark 2009: 15).
The problem of competition
While the issue of valuation refers to the constitution of actor goals and is in this
sense prior to market exchange proper, the two remaining coordination problems
address the general issue of how market actors can turn their preferences into
preferred market outcomes. Now the exchange itself takes center stage. The
discussion focuses again on the role of social macrostructures, and on questions of
how stable and profit-enabling macrostructures are established in markets and how
they change.
The coordination problem to be discussed first is competition.10 One of the
insights of neoclassical theory is the paradox that while perfect markets are efficient,
in market equilibrium the marginal costs equal the marginal returns and thus no
profit beyond “the opportunity cost of the equity capital provided by the owner[s] of
the firm” (Douma and Schreuder 2002: 30) can be made. Profit becomes possible
only when markets find themselves in disequilibrium (Chamberlin 1933; Knight
1985; Robinson 1933). This paradox has profound consequences for the under-
standing of markets: While competition is a constitutive precondition for markets, it
also threatens the profit expectations of producers. Suppliers therefore have an
interest in establishing market structures that shield them favorably from
competitors, allowing them to reduce uncertainty with regard to their profit or wage
10 I limit the discussion to competition between producers, leaving out competition on the demand side.
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expectations. At the same time, however, this affects the interests of competitors and
demanders. Through the deviation from the ideal of perfect markets, market barriers
are erected leading to prices that are higher than economically necessary. This
conflict of interest constitutes a market struggle (Weber 1978: 72) on the structure of
competition, which takes place between market competitors, the state and interest
groups on the demand side over the containment, expansion, shaping and regulation
of competition (Lie 1997: 345). The behavior of market actors may be understood in
the terminology of “getting action” and “blocking action” (White 1992), which
describes the intention to gain an advantage over competitors in network terms. The
structuration of competition does not only resolve a coordination problem but leads
to contested distributional results and is therefore a precarious compromise reflecting
the inequalities of the power of actors in the market field. Hence the specific
organization of competition is a contingent political and historical phenomenon. For
a macrosociology of markets it is the investigation of the evolution of structures of
competition and the explanation of its direction which provides access to the
understanding of capitalist development (Djelic 2006).
Firms and labor alleviate some of the uncertainty created by competition
themselves by product differentiation, first-mover advantages, reciprocal agree-
ments, corruption, collusion, cartels, or by achieving a monopoly position to
stabilize their profit opportunities. This also shows the interconnectedness between
valuation processes and competition. The creation of consumer “attachment” to
specific products leads to their “singularization,” creating de facto local monopolies
through differentiation, and “is the mainspring of competition” (Callon, Méadel, and
Rabeharisoa 2002: 202). Harrison White’s (White 1981) market model also portrays
the structure of markets in terms of product differentiations that allow producers to
position themselves in niches. Regulations of competition devised by the suppliers in
the market themselves can rely on institutional forms like standard setting or
voluntary agreements that operate as soft law; they can be based on networks such as
cartels; and they can be based on cognitive frames such as economic theories (Callon
1998; Miller 2002) or taken-for-granted routine knowledge on how to compete in a
given market field (Fligstein 2001a).
However, institutional regulations devised by the state play the most important
role in the organization of competition. The state is involved through its legislation,
for instance in antitrust law, labor law, or intellectual property law as well as through
the introduction of subsidies, duties, and consumer protection measures. The demand
side of the market interface is primarily involved in these state-devised regulations
through its interest in lower prices, through competition among suppliers and its
interest in consumer protection measures (Trumbull 2006). While the role of the
state is, on the one hand, to ensure competition despite the interest of powerful firms
to reduce it, the state is also engaged in reducing competition among suppliers
within its jurisdiction by imposing import tariffs, for example, and—in the case of
labor markets—by restricting immigration and allowing for collective bargaining.
This means that the state is increasing uncertainty, especially through antitrust law,
while reducing it through regulations limiting competition in markets, which shows
how contradictory tendencies are simultaneously built into the system. The
structuring of competition creates predictability for market actors but only
contributes to capitalist growth if uncertainty is not removed altogether through
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the strangulation of competition (Collins 1990: 112). The economic position of
suppliers must remain continually threatened by competition for market dynamics to
unfold. However, the limitation of competition enabling “reproducible role
structures” (White 1981) to develop in markets, is also essential for constituting
confidence in investment decisions and shaping the order of markets.
Labor markets are especially important markets with regard to the regulation of
competition because they provide the only source of income for a vast majority of
the population. They are also important because they demonstrate very obviously
how the institutional regulation of competition not only reduces uncertainty by
creating stable expectations but establishes economic inequalities and allocates
market risks between market actors, i.e., employers, employees, and the state, as
well. As stated above, the order of markets depends not just on “stable worlds”
(Fligstein 2001a), but also on socially acceptable outcomes. Only if the resulting
inequalities are accepted will the organization of economic activities through
markets gain the social legitimacy that is itself a precondition for the functioning of
markets. While the social and political power exercised in markets leads to
significant levels of social inequality (Offe 2006), extreme inequality may result in
social protest and thereby even threaten the market system itself.11 Hence the
operation of markets can only be understood within the larger context of society.
Actors demand the regulation of labor markets and may resist marketization, pushing
their interests in political struggles. The embeddedness of markets draws strongly on
the struggles between economic and social logics in society; markets are as much
political arenas as they are economic realms. This aspect of the embeddedness of
markets has found scant attention in the new economic sociology so far.
The problem of cooperation
The problem of cooperation arises from the social risks that market actors incur
because of their incomplete knowledge of the intentions of their exchange partners
and the quality of the product they wish to purchase. Market relations are risky when
one exchange partner makes an advance payment without being sure whether the
other party will actually fulfill the contractual obligations, or when contracts are
incomplete. The more difficult it is to recognize or specify the quality of a product
(Akerlof 1970) and the less able the buyer is to infer the seller’s actual intentions
from his manifest signals (Bacharach and Gambetta 2001), the greater these risks
are. Only when buyers are confident of not being exploited by their contract partners
will they engage in market exchange. Creating this confidence is thus a fundamental
precondition of stable market relations (Barbalet 1998: 82ff; DiMaggio 2002).
Conversely, markets implode as soon as this confidence disappears. A striking
example of this, among many, is the panic that breaks out among depositors at banks
(allegedly) threatened with insolvency.
Solutions to the problem of cooperation have been discussed widely in the social
sciences over the last thirty years, mostly in the context of the notion of trust
(Axelrod 1984; Bacharach and Gambetta 2001; Coleman 1990; Cook 2001;
11 This refers to Durkheim’s notion of anomic suicide, which is connected in his work with his discussion
of unfair prices, especially the price of labor (see Durkheim 1984: 162f; Beckert 2001).
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Gambetta 1988; Luhmann 1979). Institutional economics and game theory as well as
the new economic sociology have investigated a variety of social mechanisms that
contribute to raising ego’s estimation of the probability of cooperative action on the
part of alter ego, and thus prevent market failure caused by expecting the exchange
partner to defect. The different approaches can be categorized largely along
disciplinary lines.
Economic advances explain cooperation on an individualistic basis. This can be
seen, for instance, in game theoretical approaches, which understand cooperation in
prisoner’s-dilemma games as a result of the expectation of repeated interactions
(iterative games) that change the incentive structures of the players, making
cooperation (or conditional cooperation) the rational strategy (Axelrod 1984). A
second line of argumentation takes institutions into account that induce cooperative
strategies through the effective sanctioning of defectors. These economic approaches
are limited: Game theory is unrealistic with regard to the knowledge actors require in
a given situation in order to act rationally. To the extent that institutions protecting
cooperative relationships are seen as the result of efficient institutional design, the
path dependency of institutional development is not taken into account.
Power-oriented approaches proceed from the enforcement of compliance based on
the threat of force. Threats to secure cooperation figure especially prominently in
illegal markets in which the exchange partners cannot rely upon state-guaranteed
legal protection and must ensure cooperation privately, while under pressure of
possible state prosecution (Besozzi 2001). While power undoubtedly can play an
important role in securing cooperation, its scope does not suffice to explain the
integration of market exchange when market relations are voluntary.
Other sociological approaches to the problem of cooperation show how networks
and institutions pattern the cooperation between actors. Network approaches view
the willingness of actors to accept the social risks of market exchange as a function
of the structure of social networks. Mark Granovetter (Granovetter 1985: 490ff,
2005) points to the significance of network structures for the development of trust
between market parties. A person who has already had positive experiences with an
exchange partner in previous transactions or at least knows a trustworthy person who
has had interactions with him or her is more likely to accept the contract risk than an
individual for whom the exchange partner is a complete stranger. Networks through
which information travels more easily are better equipped to induce cooperative
behavior, because their structures facilitate the sanctioning of defectors. Although
the extent to which “social capital” can actually be built instrumentally is contested
(e.g. Burt 1992), network approaches to cooperation generally analyze social
structure as the result of long historical processes (Putnam 1993; Gambetta 1988).
Institutionalist approaches in economic sociology regard the exchange partners’
normative or cognitive commitment to institutionalized rules as key to explaining
cooperative behavior. Even the highly stratetegic trading relations of currency
dealers on financial markets are regulated by rules of conduct that govern the
exchange and are enforced by an informal honor code and sanctioned when violated
(Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2002: 936ff).
There is no guarantee that networks, social norms or tradition effectively enhance
cooperation, and it is also evident that some cooperation in markets is disadvanta-
geous to economic welfare. Highly fragmented network structures are detrimental to
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cooperation (Granovetter 1973: 1373f), as are non-universalist ethical orientations,
which prescribe cooperative behavior in exchange with members of the same ethnic
group but not in exchange with outsiders (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).
Moreover, collusion between “competitors” can be a source of inefficiency and
economic exclusion. However, whether restraints on individual rationality are
“beneficial” (Streeck 1997) is also a question of perspective: Beneficial for whom?
Market actors benefit and suffer differently from existing constraints and might gain
advantages from free-riding; they will therefore engage in struggles to either change,
defend, or exploit existing cooperative structures and rules as part of the “market
struggle.” While lasting market relations would be impossible without stabilized
expectations regarding the cooperation of exchange partners, the possibility of
defection remains, and is merely “suspended” (Möllering 2006) by trust between the
exchange partners. Why people “suspend” the suspicion of getting exploited “cannot
be conceived or implemented from within a theory of behavior that admits only of
rational action” (Granovetter 2002: 40).
The dynamics of markets
Studying markets from the perspective of the problem of social order initially leads
to a foregrounding of static elements. It is a matter of creating stable expectations for
actors by reducing the contingency entailed in the freedom of alter ego, which gives
the decision makers the confidence to be able to make investment and consumer
decisions that will, by and large, not lead to disappointing outcomes. Such “stable
worlds” (Fligstein 2001a) are a precondition for the expansion of markets. Historically,
the emergence of modern, rational capitalism may be viewed as a process of
developing institutional regulations, ethical action orientations and socio-structural
linkages, which have made it possible to contain the coordination problems discussed
here (Berghoff 2004; Block and Evans 2005; Fligstein 2001a; Hellmann 2003; Weber
1992; Zucker 1986).
In the discussion of the three coordination problems, I have indicated that the
processes of creating stability of expectations represent only one side of market
coordination. Value attributions change, profitable competitive positions are
threatened by new products or altered regulations, and the danger of defection
persists despite institutional safeguards, social norms, and cooperation enhancing
network structures. Though “stable expectations” are preconditions for market
exchange, they do not remove the essential element of uncertainty from economic
decision-making. Instead, the coexistence of “stable worlds” and uncertainty is an
unavoidable state of affairs for capitalist economies and an indispensable
precondition for their dynamics.
Empirically speaking, capitalist economies are characterized by the systematic
expansion and continual renewal of uncertainty (cf. Deutschmann 2007). This
uncertainty can result from exogenously caused crises but stems mostly from the
innovative dynamism of capitalism itself, the connection of previously isolated
markets, and the substantive and geographical expansion of markets through
changes in the competitive structure (Fligstein 2001a: 32). In competitive
economies, innovations endanger the economic value of the products they seek to
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replace. The same holds true for new regulations or the deregulation of markets. The
extension of the competitive mechanism as a result of political and social struggles
introduces uncertainty into fields of action heretofore subject to institutional
constraints (Weber 1978: 635ff; Polanyi 1957). The emergence of labor markets is
the most important example of this. An investigation of the historical processes
influencing the development of multiple forms of market regulation, and of the ways
they subsequently change, opens the analysis of markets to the macrodimensions of
the evolution and varieties of capitalism (Djelic 2006).
Theoretically, the relationship between uncertainty and profits demonstrates the
constitutive significance of “zones of unpredictability” for the capitalist economy.
Frank Knight (Knight 1985) has pointed out that under conditions where a calculus
of risks is possible, what neoclassical theory showed for perfect markets applies:
there are no profits. Only situations containing uncertainty make room for
entrepreneurial action in the Schumpeterian sense. Although market transactions
are always institutionally and sociostructurally embedded, actors inevitably face
imponderables that constitute the uncertainties and opportunities upon which
capitalist dynamism is based.
The nexus of the necessary reduction of uncertainty through the embeddedness of
market exchange and the simultaneous preservation of a “realm of unpredictability”
can be used to build a model of the dynamic character of capitalism centred on the
notion of “dynamic disequilibrium.” By this term I allude to the continuous
processual changes built into capitalist accumulation that are not moving toward a
static equilibrium but reflect permanent contestation in the economic field, where
actors with partly overlapping, partly opposing interests engage in “control efforts”
(White 1992: 9ff) to shape and use social macrostructures to enhance their goals.
These control projects and their dynamic characters have social preconditions that
are partly systemic, partly institutional and partly rooted in the capabilities of human
actors.
(1) The systemic preconditions for the unprecedented dynamism of modern
capitalism can be described on two levels. On the level of market competition,
“free-market pressures force firms into a continuing process of innovation”
(Baumol 2002: viii). On the level of capital accumulation, capital owners are
forced to constantly seek new opportunities for investment, from which they
expect to derive profits (Deutschmann 1999: 130ff).
(2) Institutionally, it is precisely the expansion of markets and the concurrent
anchoring of competition as the basis of the organization of economic production
and distribution that constitutes an environment that is comparatively open to
change through deviant behavior. Competition constantly forces suppliers to seek
out new opportunities in order to make profitable investments. The (ideal and
typically viewed) curbing of traditional limitations and restrictions on the
exercise of hierarchical power in markets favors innovation (Beckert 1999: 792f).
Also one can point to the contradictions and mutually undermining dynamics of
the institutions contextualizing market behavior which can lead to endogenous
change dynamics. Established social arrangements produce “a complex array of
contradictions, continually generating tensions and conflicts within and across
social systems, which may, under some circumstances, shape consciousness and
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action to change the present order” (Seo and Creed 2002: 225). Emerging
institutional contradictions may open up new opportunities, leading to responses
which make different regulations possible or create new networks which shift the
composition of power in the market field. The embeddedness of markets consists
of so many, sometimes contradictory, institutional facets that solutions in one
area cause new problems elsewhere, leading to a permanent process of opening
up opportunities for endogenously triggered change (Schneiberg 2005; Leblebici
et al. 1991).
(3) On the actor level, the dynamic processes of continuous change are rooted in
the human ability to envision future states of the world and, based on these
visions, to abandon routinized behavior (Beckert 2003: 775). In Joseph
Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter 1934, 1991), concept of “creative destruction,” this
“creativity of action” (Joas 1996) became the starting point for a theory of the
dynamism of capitalism based on the “creative reconstruction of social patterns
on the basis of a reasoned analysis” (Seo and Creed 2002: 225).12
These general considerations regarding change can be related to the three
coordination problems identified above. Entrepreneurs are systematically trying to
change consumers’ value attachments by attempting to convince them of the
(superior) value of their products. Their success contributes in turn to the devaluation
of the products substituted, hence creating uncertainty in the market. This process is
fueled not only by market suppliers, but also by consumers looking for new ways to
express status differentiation and lifestyles and to create “self-illusionary experi-
ences” (Campbell 1987: 89) constructed from the meanings associated with
products. At the same time entrepreneurs are seeking to remodel the structures of
competition in ways that provide more favorable market positions for them. If they
succeed, this results in regulatory changes that re-configure markets and thereby
create dynamism. Finally, entrepreneurs are trying to induce others to cooperate with
them by investing in activities that signal the trustworthiness of their products,
promising new ways to create value, and forming coalitions or social movements in
markets which align others’ behavior with their own intentions (Davis, et al. 2004;
DiMaggio 2002; Stark 2009; White 1992). The opportunities for change emerge
from the dynamic interactions between the social macrostructures including
technological changes; the developing contradictions are being exploited by
entrepreneurs who change the way the market is embedded.
In capitalist economies, the complex embeddedness of markets comes up against
actors’ motivations to find new ways to secure profits or utility and contradictory
institutional configurations that lead to a continual challenging of existing
institutions, networks, products, and technologies by innovation. This perpetually
renews the uncertainty for actors—paradoxically precisely in the attempt to master it.
Deviant action produces both the profit opportunities that provide the incentive to
produce for the market and the destabilization that forces other actors to adapt, and
12 Following Christoph Deutschmann (Deutschmann 1999, 2007), the significance of this quality of action
for the capitalist economy can be extended still further: creativity is not merely a typical feature of
entrepreneurial action, but rather a characteristic of free labor power as such. “Added value,” the argument
goes, arises from exhausting the creative potential of human resources in the production process, the
results of which are never predictable.
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that must be mitigated by the socio-structural, institutional, and cultural embedded-
ness of markets. In this way the market struggle between competitors leads to states
of disequilibrium, which are constantly changing.
Conclusion
If one views market action from the perspective of the three coordination problems,
the focus is on the interaction between actors and their institutional, cultural, and
social embeddedness. These social macrostructures and their dynamic changes play
a more fundamental role in the study of ordering processes in markets than the price
mechanism foregrounded in neoclassical theory (Hayek 1973: 115ff). Although
changes in prices emerge from changes in supply and demand, these changes
themselves are the result of the social, institutional and cognitive structures of
markets. Hence prices are not seen as the aggregate result of individual preferences
but rather as the outcome of social macrostructures patterning economic action.
The approach to the sociology of markets suggested in this article seeks to
understand how coordination problems are solved in order to account for why, and
under what conditions, markets become successful devices for the organization of
economic activities. The concern is, on the one hand, with the constitution of actor
preferences, which are explained based on normative, cultural, and social structural
influences stemming from the social context in which market actors live. On the
other hand, the sociology of markets aims to understand how market actors realize
their preferences in the exchange process. Here they are confronted with two further
coordination problems: competition and cooperation. Again, the assumption
underlying the sociology of markets is that these problems are resolved based on
the regulative influence of social macrostructures—institutions, social networks, and
cognitive structures.
The challenge for the sociology of markets is to show how these structural forces
actually influence market outcomes, and to explain in detail how the macrostructures
emerge, stabilize, and change in processes of social interaction. Contrary to
economic institutionalism, it is not assumed that social macrostructures can be
explained by the efficiency concerns of market actors. It is not just the complexities
of decision-making, but also collective action dilemmas and the historicity of
institutions and networks that refute this reductionist view. Instead, social macro-
structures are seen as historical manifestations of material and ideal interests of
actors commanding the social and political power to shape market fields. The
development of the macrostructures prevailing in markets needs to be understood as
a political, social, and cultural process which can be explained only by following the
historical development of the evolution of specific markets.
Just as the influence of institutions, networks, and cognition on the interaction
processes of market exchange is an important field for the sociology of markets, so is the
emergence and change of these structures. How do actors’ preferences interact with the
social macrostructures that form the conditions for action in the exchange process? We
have little systematic knowledge of how social macrostructures translate into
preferences and the behavior of actors. It is not enough to look at social macrostructures
as constraints on action, and explain outcomes as rational or culturally infused responses
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to these constraints. Neither rationalist interpretations nor cultural and morphological
determinism do justice to the contingency of interpretations of social macrostructures
by agents (Jagd 2007: 78). Although the meaning that a social situation attains for
actors, as well as their reactions, are influenced by cultural templates, institutions, or
network positions, they are not determined by them. These issues can be explored by
studying diverse markets empirically and historically with an eye to the coordination
problems discussed here. The broadest objective of this undertaking is to develop a
“sociological theory of economic action” (Weber 1978 Vol. 1: 68).
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